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Diligence and Digiovanni: The Fourth Circuit's Interpretation
of Investigatory Traffic Stop Reasonableness After Arizona v.
Johnson*

INTRODUCTION

Between 1986 and 2001, Operations Convoy and Pipeline, joint
task forces between the Drug Enforcement Administration and state
highway patrols, successfully seized over 2.9 million pounds of
marijuana and $704 million in currency during routine traffic stops
along major American interstates. 1 As the number of these seizures
increased, drug enforcement officials became highly skilled at asking
"key questions" to determine whether a person was transporting
narcotics. 2 Counterbalancing the efficacy of the officers' questioning
techniques was the Fourth Amendment's protection against
"unreasonable searches and seizures."' The cornerstone of the Fourth
Amendment has always been a fact-specific inquiry into the
reasonableness of a search and seizure;4 however, determining what
constitutes reasonableness has not proven to be a simple inquiry. The
traffic stop paradigm serves as an oft-litigated battleground for courts
* © 2012 Brian J. Litwak.
1. See Operations Pipeline and Convoy, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN.,
http://www.justice.gov/dea/programs/pipecon.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2012).
2. Id.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968). The paradigmatic example of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is a search or seizure pursuant to a warrant.
See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (detailing the Court's warrant
preference). See generally California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581-83 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (chronicling the tension in Supreme Court jurisprudence between the warrant
and reasonableness clauses); 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 10.01 (5th ed. 2010) (outlining the
interaction between the warrant clause and the reasonableness clause); Akhil Reed Amar,
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 762, 762-63, 767-71 (1994)
(detailing the different variations in the warrant requirement). The evolution of the
"automobile exception" marks a significant deviation from the warrant preference. See 1
DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra §§ 13.01-13.05. This Recent Development focuses on the
subset of Fourth Amendment law surrounding the "automobile exception." This refers to
the general rule that, given both the exigencies unique to vehicles rendering obtaining a
warrant impractical and the reduced expectation of privacy in a vehicle, officers can search
an automobile without a warrant if supported by probable cause of criminal activity. See
Pennsylvania v. Lebron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (exigencies); New York v. Class, 475 U.S.
106, 112-13 (1986) (reduced expectation of privacy); Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 35
GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 37, 94-95 (2006).
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to determine what constitutes reasonable conduct under the Fourth
Amendment. 5
Recent Supreme Court holdings in Arizona v. Johnson6 and
Muehler v. Mena7 complicated the reasonableness inquiry under the
Fourth Amendment by altering the traditional analytical framework
set forth in the landmark decision of Terry v. Ohio.8 Under the
traditional Terry analysis, reasonableness of a traffic stop was
embodied in two separate inquiries-the scope of the questioning and
duration of the stop.9 Johnson and Muehler cast a cloud of doubt
concerning to what extent the two traditional prongs of the Terry
analysis had survived. 10The Fourth Circuit recently grappled with this
issue in United States v. Digiovanni.1a
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Digiovanni interpreted Johnson
and Muehler as not eliminating the scope prong of the traditional
Terry analysis altogether, but rather as combining the scope analysis
within the duration analysis, forming a single diligence inquiry. This
Recent Development argues that, in doing so, the Fourth Circuit
correctly maintained the fact-specific nature logically underpinning
Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis. The Fourth Circuit's
reasoning, while not clearly articulated, effectively sketched the
outline of a workable framework for analyzing the reasonableness of
investigatory traffic stops without contradicting recent Supreme
Court precedent.
This Recent Development proceeds in four parts. Part I will
provide a background concerning the analytical framework applied to
traffic stops under Terry and its progeny. Part II provides the facts
and holdings of Digiovanni.Part III analyzes the "diligence" standard
applied by the Fourth Circuit in Johnson's wake. Finally, Part IV
articulates a workable framework to analyze investigatory traffic
stops consistent with the Fourth Circuit's holding in Digiovanni and
the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson.

5. See generally 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 9.3 (4th ed. 2010) ("In
recent years more Fourth Amendment battles have been fought about police activities
incident to a stopping for a traffic infraction.., than in any other context." (citation
omitted)).
6. 555 U.S. 323 (2009).
7. 544 U.S. 93 (2005).
8. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
9. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19).
10. See infra Part I.D.
11. 650 F.3d 498 (4th Cir. 2011).

2144

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

I. TERRY AS APPLIED TO TRAFFIC STOP ANALYSIS

A.

Terry's Basics

The logical starting point for any discussion of traffic stops is
unquestionably Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court's landmark
decision establishing an officer's ability to briefly detain an individual
without a warrant to conduct a cursory frisk of the suspect's outer
clothing if the officer possesses reasonable suspicion that criminal
activity may be afoot.12 Terry involved a stop and interrogation of
men whose conduct attracted the attention of a police officer on
patrol."3 The officer suspected that the men were preparing to rob a
nearby store. 14 Fearing that one of the men was armed, the officer
performed a pat-down of Terry's outer clothing, revealing a
concealed weapon. 15 The Supreme Court held that the officer's
conduct did not violate Terry's Fourth Amendment rights, but
explained that "[t]he scope of the search must be 'strictly tied to and
justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation
permissible."' 6 Although Terry dealt specifically with an officer's
ability to stop-and-frisk a potentially armed suspect, 7 it became the
model for traffic stop reasonableness analysis.18
Under the Terry analysis for a traffic stop, the first question is
whether, at the onset of the stop, the "officer's action was justified at
its inception."19 In the traffic stop paradigm, this is rarely a point of
contention.2" A court must then determine if the investigation "was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
12. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; see also DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 4,

§ 17.04[B] (distinguishing arrests from "Terry stops" based on the length of detention).
13. Terry, 392 U.S. at 7.
14. Id. at 6-7.

15. Id. at 7.
16. Id. at 19 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J.,

concurring)).
17. Id. at 30.
18. See, e.g., United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868,875 (4th Cir. 1992).
19. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
20. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005); 4 LAFAVE supra note 5, § 9.3

("In the run-of-the-mill case, [justifying a traffic stop] presents no significant problem, for
most traffic stops are made based upon the direct observations of unambiguous conduct or
circumstances by the stopping officer."); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813
(1996) (holding that the subjective intent of the officer is irrelevant to the underlying
reason for conducting a traffic stop, so long as at the outset of the stop "probable cause
exists to believe that a traffic violation has occurred"); Richard S. Frase, What Where They
Thinking? Fourth Amendment Unreasonableness in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 329, 333 (2002) ("[A]lmost every driver violates some minor traffic law
every time he drives.").
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interference in the first place."' 21 This language established the
relationship of scope to the reasonableness standard. In Berkemer v.
McCarty,22 the Supreme Court held that "the usual traffic stop is23
more analogous to a so-called 'Terry stop' than to a formal arrest.
Since this declaration, Terry has been the starting point for traffic
24
stop-related reasonableness inquiries.
B.

Scope and DurationAfter Terry

In Florida v. Royer,2 the Supreme Court established two
independent prongs of analysis to evaluate the reasonableness of a
traffic stop-scope and duration.26 Subsequent Court decisions
revealed that a violation of one prong, independent of the other,
would be sufficient to violate the Fourth Amendment.27 With respect
to the scope prong, the Supreme Court unanimously held in Knowles
v. Iowa that an officer could not conduct a search of a car's passenger
compartment incident to a citation for speeding. 28 The Court, with no
mention of duration, found that this "search incident to citation"
violated the original scope of issuing a speeding citation.29
Concerning the duration prong, the Supreme Court first hinted
in a brief footnote that the prolongation of a traffic stop alone could
constitute a reasonableness violation. The footnote, appearing at the
conclusion of Michigan v. Summers,3 explained that "a prolonged
detention[] might lead to a different conclusion in an unusual case."31
This footnote invited future Fourth Amendment challenges arising
21. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
22. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
23. Id. at 439 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. 1).
24. See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009); United States v. Sharpe, 470
U.S. 675, 682 (1985); United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 875 (4th Cir. 1992) ("An

ordinary traffic stop is, however, a limited seizure more like an investigative detention
than a custodial arrest. We therefore employ the Supreme Court's analysis for
investigative detention used in Terry v. Ohio to determine the limits of police conduct in

routine traffic stops." (citations omitted)).
25. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).

26. Id. at 500 ("It is the State's burden to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to
justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was reasonably limited in scope and duration

to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure." (emphasis added)).
27. See, e.g., Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118 (1998) (scope); Sharpe, 470 U.S. at

686 (duration).
28. Knowles, 525 U.S. at 118.
29. Id. ("Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the

evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further evidence of
excessive speed was going to be found either on the person of the offender or in the
passenger compartment of the car.").
30. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).

31. Id. at 705 n.21.
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from prolonged detentions alone. United States v. Place12 gave
credence to the possibility that prolonged detention alone could
trigger a constitutional violation. In Place, federal agents seized a
suspect's bag and held it for ninety minutes without probable cause.33
The Court held that "[tihe length of the detention of respondent's
luggage alone precludes the conclusion that the seizure was
reasonable in the absence of probable cause." 34 With Summers and
Place setting the foundation for reasonableness challenges to
detentions based solely on prolongation, the concept was finally
applied to the traffic stop paradigm in United States v. Sharpe.3 5 In
Sharpe, the Court found that a twenty minute detention did not
constitute an unreasonable seizure.36 However, the Court evaluated
the diligence of the police in dispelling or confirming their suspicions
as a crucial aspect of the duration analysis.3 7 Terry and its progeny
demonstrated that courts, when analyzing the reasonableness of a
warrantless detention, would view the scope of an officer's
questioning and the duration of the stop as independent inquiries
under the Fourth Amendment.3 8
C.

The Weakening of the Scope Prong in Illinois v. Caballes

In 2005, the Supreme Court created uncertainty regarding the
two-pronged analysis set forth in Royer twenty-two years earlier with
its decision in Illinois v. Caballes.39 In Caballes, an Illinois state
trooper pulled over Caballes for speeding on an interstate highway."
A narcotics-detection dog was immediately brought to the scene and
alerted to the trunk of the car. 4 The subsequent search yielded
marijuana, and the entire incident lasted under ten minutes.42 The

32. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
33. Id. at 699.
34. Id. at 709. The Court also noted that "the brevity of the invasion of the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests is an important factor in determining whether
the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion." Id.
35. 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
36. Id. at 687-88.
37. Id. at 686 ("In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified
as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police
diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their
suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant." (citing
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 701 n.14 (1981))).
38. See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 9.3.
39. 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
40. Id. at 406.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and suppressed
the evidence, declaring that "because the canine sniff was performed
without any 'specific and articulable facts' to suggest drug activity, the
use of the dog 'unjustifiably enlarge[ed] the scope of a routine traffic
stop into a drug investigation.' ""
In analyzing the detention, the Supreme Court found the use of
the drug detection dog justified, looking only at whether the stop was
"prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete [its]
mission."' The Court briefly disposed of the contention that the
widening of the scope of the investigation-from a speeding citation
to a narcotics search performed without reasonable suspicion of drug
activity-violated the scope prong of Terry, concluding that
"conducting a dog sniff would not change the character of a traffic
stop that is lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a
reasonable manner."45 As the dissent noted, "the Court diminishe[d]
the Fourth Amendment's force by abandoning the second Terry
inquiry (was the police action 'reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances [justifying] the [initial] interference')."4 6 While it was
initially uncertain if the diminishment of the scope restriction would
apply solely to narcotic searches performed by canines, the Court
would soon expand this analysis to cover all traffic stops.
D. Johnson and Muehler Cast Further Uncertainty onto the Terry
Analysis
Two months after the Caballes decision, the Supreme Court
further diminished the application of the scope prong to Terry's
reasonableness analysis in Muehler v. Mena.47 In Muehler, the police
detained a suspect in handcuffs while executing a search warrant on
the premises Mena occupied.4 8 While being detained in handcuffs,
police officers began questioning Mena about her immigration

43. Id. at 407 (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202, 205
(Ill. 2003)).
44. Id.

45. Id. at 408.
46. Id. at 421 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
Justice Souter also analyzed the search under the scope prong, concluding, "[t]he
unwarranted and nonconsensual expansion of the seizure here from a routine traffic stop
to a drug investigation broadened the scope of the investigation in a manner that, in my
judgment, runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 420-21 (emphasis added).
47. 544 U.S. 93 (2005).
48. Id. at 95-96.
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status,49 a line of questioning completely divorced from the search
warrant's objective. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found
that the officers' inquiry into Mena's immigration status violated the
Fourth Amendment.5" The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
unrelated questioning of Mena, although outside the scope of the
warrant, did not prolong the detention and therefore did not amount
to a Fourth Amendment violation." Muehler signified a radical
departure from the traditional Terry analysis, symbolizing, to some

commentators, the final interment of the scope prong. 2
After Muehler, uncertainty persisted as to what extent the scope
prong had survived, if at all, with respect to the traffic stop context. 3
In Arizona v. Johnson, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the

officer's unrelated questioning into the detainee's gang affiliation
during a traffic stop, accompanied by a subsequent pat-down, did not
violate Johnson's Fourth Amendment rights. 4 The Court declared,

"An officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for
the traffic stop, this Court has made plain, do not convert the
encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those
inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop."55
E. Questions After Johnson
The Court's interpretation of Muehler as presumably allowing an

officer to inquire into any matters unrelated to the reason for the
stop, coupled with the Court's announcement of a new analytical
framework-whether questioning "measurably extends" a stopcalled into question the traditional Terry framework for analyzing

traffic stops.56 Did the Court announce a bright-line rule declaring
49. Id. at 96. The search warrant authorized a broad search of the house for deadly
weapons and evidence of gang membership. Id. at 95-96.
50. Id. at 97.
51. Id. at 101-02 ("[T]he Court of Appeals did not find that the questioning extended
[Therefore] the officers' questioning of Mena did not
the time Mena was detained ....
constitute an independent Fourth Amendment violation.").
52. See, e.g., 4 LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 9.3(b) ("[B]y virtue of Caballes [sic] and its
progeny the original Terry [sic] limitations of 'scope and duration' have been reduced by
one (scope)...." (citation omitted)); Reid M. Bolton, Comment, The Legality of
Prolonged Traffic Stops After Herring: Brief Delays as Isolated Negligence, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1781, 1786-87 (2009) (noting that Mena signaled the end of investigative-scope
scrutiny).
53. See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 9.3(d).
54. 555 U.S. 323, 329 (2009).
55. Id. at 333-34 (emphasis added) (citing Muehler, 544 U.S. at 100-01).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Everett, 601 F.3d 484, 491 (6th Cir. 2010) ("The first
decision we must make is whether to construe Muehler and Johnson as establishing a
bright-line 'no prolongation' rule ....).
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any prolongation of a detention, no matter how minimal, a
constitutional violation? As long as an officer does not extend the
length of the stop, may she inquire about any subject matter
regardless of the relationship between the questioning and the
justification of the detention? What is the correct framework going
forward for lower courts to apply to detentions made incident to
routine traffic stops? These were the exact issues facing the Fourth
Circuit when it issued its opinion in Digiovanni.

II.

UNITED STATES V. DIGIOVANNI

Just before noon on July 28, 2009, Maryland State Police
Trooper Christopher Conner pulled over Stephen Gerard Digiovanni
for following too closely to the car in front of him while traveling
northbound on Interstate 95 in a rental car.57 After collecting
Digiovanni's driver's license and rental contract, Trooper Conner
8
asked generic questions regarding Digiovanni's travel itinerary.
Three minutes into the search, Officer Conner redirected his line of
questioning toward potential drug trafficking.5 9 After approximately a
minute and a half of questioning Digiovanni about drugs, Trooper
Conner asked for Digiovanni's consent to search the car, to which
Digiovanni responded, "[I]f you want to, that's not a problem." 60
Over the next three minutes, Digiovanni attempted to open the trunk
of the car, but could not.61 Trooper Conner found this "extremely
suspicious" since, based on his experience, drug traffickers frequently
disable the trunk-latch. 62 After Digiovanni was unable to open the
trunk, almost nine minutes after initially being pulled over, Trooper
Conner continued to ask Digiovanni about drugs.63 Ten minutes after
Digiovanni was stopped, Trooper Conner began processing
Digiovanni's driver's license.'
The dispatcher informed Trooper Conner that Digiovanni did
not have any outstanding warrants.65 Fifteen minutes after initially
being pulled over, Trooper Conner returned to Digiovanni's rental
car, issued Digiovanni a warning ticket, and told him, "[H]ere you go,

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 501 (4th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 502.
Id. at 503.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id.
Id. at 504.
Id.
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sir. You are free to go."66 Immediately after Trooper Conner handed

Digiovanni the warning ticket, he returned to the subject of drugs and
informed Digiovanni that "we do have a bad problem out here,
people smuggling drugs on the interstate."67 Again Trooper Conner
asked for permission to search the car; however, this time Trooper
Conner had Digiovanni sign a written consent form.68 The form was
signed at 12:09 p.m., sixteen minutes after Digiovanni was initially
pulled over.69
The ensuing search yielded 34,091 pills of Oxycodone and $1,450
of cash.7" At trial, the district court granted Digiovanni's motion to
suppress the evidence.71 The district court concluded that "the stop
lasted longer than necessary" to effectuate the purpose of the stopissuing Digiovanni a simple warning ticket for a minor traffic
infraction. The district court found no reasonable suspicion to
support the length of Digiovanni's detention.7 3 The district court also
disallowed the admission of Digiovanni's signed consent, noting that
when Officer Conner instantaneously returned to the subject of drugs
after he informed Digiovanni that he was free to go, Officer Conner
falsely implied "that Digiovanni was bound by his earlier consent."7 4
The government appealed the district court's holding.75
After quickly determining that the delay caused by Trooper
Conner's questioning was not de minimis, the Fourth Circuit turned
its attention to whether the Supreme Court's "measurably extend"
language used in Johnson amounted to a bright-line rule prohibiting
any prolongation of detentions.76 The court determined it did not,
explaining instead that "where a delay can be characterized as de
minimis under the totality of the circumstances, it will not be
recognized as a Fourth Amendment violation." 77 The Fourth Circuit's
analysis delved specifically into whether the officer "diligently
pursue[d] the investigation of the justification for the stop (usually a

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 505.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 510-11.
75. Id. at 510.
76. Id. at 510-11. The court characterized Trooper Conner's questioning as "extensive
and time-consuming." Id. at 510.
77. Id. at 507.
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traffic infraction)."78 With respect to the duration of the detention,
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of no
reasonable suspicion sufficient to support the length of Digiovanni's
detention.79 The Fourth Circuit noted that the sustained investigation
into the presence of drugs, instead of either writing the warning ticket
or proceeding with the driver's license check, "bespeak[s] an utter
lack of diligence."8 " Trooper Conner delayed ten minutes before he
relayed Digiovanni's information to the dispatcher.8 He proceeded
with a line of questioning regarding the presence of drugs, attempted
to have Digiovanni open his trunk, asked further questions
concerning drugs, and radioed for back-up, all before taking a single
action to effectuate the purpose of the stop: the issuance of a warning
ticket. The government argued, in part, that the total duration of the
traffic stop was reasonable. 3 The Fourth Circuit disagreed, holding
that "[u]nder the totality of the circumstances,... Trooper Conner
did not diligently pursue the traditional purposes of a traffic stop. '

III. ANALYSIS
Forced to grapple with the numerous ambiguities left after
Johnson, the Fourth Circuit correctly analyzed Digiovanniconsistent
with Terry and its progeny, while simultaneously not running afoul of
recent Supreme Court precedent. The Fourth Circuit's refusal to
interpret the "measurably extend" language as announcing a brightline rule remained loyal to the fact-specific inquiry underpinning
Fourth Amendment reasonableness. As the court noted, "[c]reating a
rule that allows a police officer fifteen minutes to do as he pleases
reduces the duration component to a bright-line rule."8 " Numerous
prior holdings emphasized that the Supreme Court "ha[s] consistently
eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific
nature of the reasonableness inquiry."8 6 Furthermore, reading

78. Id. at 509 (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985)).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 510.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 510-11.
84. Id. at 510.
85. Id.at 511; see also United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 336 (4th Cir. 2008) ("The
maximum acceptable length of a routine traffic stop cannot be stated with mathematical
precision.").
86. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21
(1968) ("The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is
assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be
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"measurable duration" to be synonymous with a "quantifiable
duration" would have been wholly inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's holding in Caballes. Caballes concluded there was no Fourth
Amendment violation because the seizure was not "prolonged
beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission." 7 To
read the "measurably extend" standard as introducing a rigid legal
standard likening any prolongation of a stop, no matter how trivial, to
a constitutional violation would cut strongly against a long history of
fact-specific Fourth Amendment reasonableness jurisprudence.8 8
A second reason the Fourth Circuit's holding was correct centers
around the practical limiting effect a no-prolongation standard would
have on the protection the Fourth Amendment affords. It has been
argued that a no-prolongation standard would serve as a barrier
against pretextual police actions.8 9 Under this line of reasoning, any
"fishing expedition[s]" 90 conducted by officers unrelated to the
purpose of the stop necessarily lengthen the detention beyond what is
necessary to "effectuate the purpose of the stop."91 However, this
argument carries little merit. A police officer could easily circumvent
the bright-line no-prolongation rule by simply delegating the routine
traffic citation issuance to a second officer, leaving the first officer
with free rein to ask any questions.9 2 This effectively transforms the
time it takes the first officer to issue the citation into the unilateral
constraint. If the officer was without a secondary officer at the time of
the traffic stop, she could easily skirt a bright-line no-prolongation

subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the
reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances.").
87. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,407 (2005) (emphasis added).
88. See, e.g., Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572-73 (1988) (rejecting a
proposed bright-line rule applicable to all investigatory stops, and rather adhering to the
traditional contextual approach to the Fourth Amendment analyzing "all of the
circumstances surrounding the incident in each individual case" (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also United States v. Mason, 628 F.3d 123, 131 (4th Cir. 2010) ("There is no
support in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for the notion that questioning unrelated to
the purpose of a traffic stop requires reasonable suspicion, provided that the questioning
occurs within the timeframe reasonably necessary to effectuate the traffic stop."). But see
Bolton, supra note 52, at 1797 (arguing that all delays in traffic stops, no matter how brief,
should be held in violation of the Fourth Amendment after Johnson).
89. See United States v. Everett, 601 F.3d 484, 491 (6th Cir. 2010).
90. United States v. Pruitt, 174 F.3d 1215, 1222 (11th Cir. 1999).
91. Id. at 1220 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)). Of course, a
traffic detention may always be extended if (1) pursuant to consent or (2) supported by
"reasonable and articulable suspicion illegal activity has occurred or is occurring." Id.
92. Everett, 601 F.3d at 492.
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rule by writing the citation while simultaneously pursuing an
unrelated avenue of questioning. 93
Furthermore, the allowance of de minimis delays prevents
counterintuitive results. For instance, finding a Fourth Amendment
violation when an officer's inexperience caused a brief delay, in the
genuine absence of subterfuge, would produce a counterintuitive
result. 94 Because a bright-line rule prohibiting de minimis delays
would fail to protect against pretextual police activities and run
contrary to well-established Fourth Amendment precedent analyzing
reasonableness in the totality of the circumstances, the Fourth Circuit
properly rejected an interpretation of Johnson as announcing a ban
on minimal prolongations resulting from suspicionless, unrelated
questioning during a traffic stop. 95
The Supreme Court's language in Johnson and Muehler created
serious doubt as to the survival of the scope prong in the traditional
Terry framework.96 However, the Fourth Circuit clearly did not
interpret those Supreme Court cases as eliminating the scope prong
altogether.97 The court explicitly rejected the government's argument,
stating it "fail[ed] to recognize that investigative stops must be limited
both in scope and duration."98
Although the court noted that both prongs-scope and
duration-were still alive and well, the court's analysis of those two
prongs in the post-Johnson world was more subtle. Instead of the
traditional approach of viewing the two prongs as independent
inquiries, a violation of either amounting to a constitutional
93. Id.
94. Had de minimis delays been disallowed, this would have been the exact outcome
in United States v. Farrior,where a police officer who had just graduated from field
training did not know how to issue warning tickets, causing a minimal delay in the
duration of the detention. 535 F.3d 210, 219 (4th Cir. 2008).
95. Other circuits have interpreted the "measurably extend" language used in
Johnson as not announcing a prohibition on de minimis delays. See Everett, 601 F.3d at
493-94; United States v. Chaney, 584 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v.
Derverger, 337 F. App'x 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2009).
96. See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009) ("An officer's inquiries into
matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop, this Court has made plain, do not
convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure ....); Muehler v. Mena,
544 U.S. 93, 100-01 (2005) (holding that police questioning alone, without an increase in
the length of the detention's duration, is not equivalent to a seizure); see also United
States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 509 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting that there is debate about
the survival of the scope component); Bolton, supra note 52, at 1786-87.
97. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d at 509 ("[T]he scope of a police officer's actions during a
traffic stop still is relevant to the reasonableness analysis under the Fourth Amendment."
(citing United States v. Mason, 628 F.3d 123, 132 (4th Cir. 2010))).
98. Id. at 511.
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violation,99 the Fourth Circuit combined the analysis of scope and
duration into a single "diligence" inquiry. The court reasoned that the
scope inquiry was still relevant to the reasonableness analysis since an
officer's failure to "diligently pursue the investigation of the
justification for the stop [would run afoul of] the duration component
of Terry [and Royer.]"1 ° In other words, if an officer's questioning
exceeds the scope of the stop, the officer runs the risk of implicating
the duration component of Terry as interpreted recently in Johnson.
The court went on to note that this determination would require an
examination of the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the
investigatory traffic stop.10'
By combining the scope and duration analysis into a single
"diligence" inquiry, viewed through the lens of the totality of the
circumstances, the Fourth Circuit did not confine itself to a stringent
position where any extraneous questioning constitutes a
reasonableness violation. 12 However, the court did not go so far as to
say that any line of questioning, no matter how irrelevant to
effectuating the purpose of the stop, may be permissible. 3 By
maintaining that a traffic stop should be viewed in light of the totality
of the circumstances, the Fourth Circuit's "diligence" inquiry
correctly allows the court flexibility in analyzing the "multitude of
factors [that] can affect the length of a traffic stop.""' More
importantly, the "diligence" inquiry does not contradict the holdings
in Johnson and Muehler. Rather, evaluating an officer's diligenceher "continual effort"' 15 toward establishing if the alleged traffic
violation occurred-potentially provides a workable standard in
determining whether an officer's inquiries "measurably extend[ed]
the duration of the stop."106

99. See discussion supra Part I.B.
100. Digiovanni,650 F.3d at 509.
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 507 ("With regard to the scope component, 'the investigative methods
employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the
officer's suspicion in a short period of time.' " (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500
(1983))).
104. Id. at 511.
105. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 522 (9th ed. 2009).
106. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009); see United States v. Everett, 601
F.3d 484, 494 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that when determining reasonableness of a traffic
stop "the overarching consideration is the officer's diligence").
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IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT REASONABLENESS ANALYSIS-A
FRAMEWORK GOING FORWARD

As previously discussed, the Digiovanniholding correctly applies
10 7
the uncertain standards set forth in Johnson and Muehler.
However, the analytical frameworks spelled out in cases relating to
reasonableness in investigatory traffic stops generally have been an
amalgamation of competing and, often times, inconsistent interests.
For instance, courts must consider a myriad of factors including the
important governmental interests at stake relative to the intrusiveness
of the action, 1 8 the overall diligence of the officer, 109 the scope of the
questioning, 110 the duration of the stop,"' and the general
considerations of the fundamental protections the Fourth
Amendment offers to drivers detained without reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity.' Digiovanni, although correctly decided, lacks
clarity in pronouncing the analytical framework applied. This Section
articulates a workable framework going forward to analyze the
reasonableness of investigatory traffic stops consistent with the
Fourth Circuit's holding in Digiovanni, the Supreme Court's holdings
in Johnson and Muehler, and longstanding principles of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.
A.

The Diligence Standard:Combining Scope and Durationinto a
Single Inquiry

Fourth Amendment reasonableness in the traffic stop context
should be analyzed under a diligence standard combining the scope of
the questioning and the duration of the stop into a single inquiry. "3
Although not clearly articulated, this is the crux of the Fourth
Circuit's reasoning in Digiovanni. The court held that the scope of an
officer's questioning during a stop is still relevant to the

107. See discussion supra Part III.
108. See, e.g., United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1221-22 (10th Cir. 2001) (weighing
the government's strong interest in officer safety against the intrusiveness of asking a
driver and passengers to exit a car). The war-on-drug considerations have also been
recognized as a governmental interest worthy of allowing limited police probing without
finding constitutional violations. See Wayne R. LaFave, The "Routine Traffic Stop" from
Start to Finish: Too Much "Routine," Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV.
1843, 1874 (2004).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985).
110. See discussion supra Part 111.
111. See, e.g., Johnson, 553 U.S. at 333.
112. See LaFave, supra note 108, at 1904.
113. The Supreme Court initially used the diligence terminology with respect to the
duration component of the traditional Terry analysis. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686.
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reasonableness analysis due to its potential implication of the
duration prong if an officer is not "diligently pursu[ing] the
' This treatment is also
investigation of the justification for the stop."114
consistent with the Sixth Circuit's combination of scope and duration
into a single diligence inquiry. 115
The coalescing of scope and duration into a single "diligence"
analysis for traffic stops is consistent with the Supreme Court's
holding in Johnson. As discussed previously, the biggest question
remaining after Johnson was how to interpret the "measurably
extend" standard the Court announced. Using a diligence standard"whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that
was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicion quickly" 16 -as a metric
for determining whether an investigatory stop was "measurably
extended" aligns with the Johnson standard. Viewing measurable
extensions through the lens of an officer's diligence elucidates the
ambiguous standard pronounced in Johnson.I7
Analyzing diligence consistent with Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence requires a fact-specific inquiry, not a bright-line rule
(such as a no-prolongation standard). The only concrete standard
embedded in the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. 8 As has
been repeatedly emphasized by courts, "The touchstone of our
analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always the reasonableness
in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a
citizen's personal security." ' 19 Examining diligence as a single inquiry
allows courts to weigh both the scope and the duration aspects of a
stop and come to a nuanced decision viewed in the totality of the
circumstances, rather than applying a stringent durational standard.

114. United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 509 (4th Cir. 2011).
115. See United States v. Everett, 601 F.3d 484, 494 (6th Cir. 2010) ("[T]he overarching
consideration is the officer's diligence .....
116. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686.
117. In fact, the use of "diligence" as a relevant inquiry after Johnson has not been
limited to the Fourth Circuit. See Everett, 601 F.3d at 494; United States v. Pittman, No.
3:10cr0046, 2011 WL 3420624, at *17 n.12, *18 (M.D. Tenn. Aug 4, 2011) (applying the
diligence standard, in light of the totality of the circumstances, to unrelated questioning
during a traffic stop).
118. See supra note 4.
119. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (emphasis added) (quoting
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 ("The question is
whether in all the circumstances.., his right to personal security was violated by an
unreasonable search and seizure."); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)
("[For] what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable
searches and seizures.").
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Diligence's OperationAlong a Continuum

In order to apply the diligence standard, it is necessary to
consider the interaction between scope and duration during an
investigatory traffic stop. This Section argues that courts should view
scope and duration as operating with an inverse correlation with one
another along a diligence continuum. In other words, the broader the
scope of questioning during an investigatory stop, the shorter the
prolongation a court should tolerate before finding an officer in
violation of the diligence standard. Conversely, the longer the
duration of a detention, the more narrowly tailored the questioning
should be to the justification of the stop to avoid running afoul of the
diligence standard.
On one end of the spectrum, there will be those rare cases where
an officer's questioning is far enough removed from the traffic stop's
justification that courts should not tolerate the question's level of
intrusiveness, no matter how brief the detention may be. For instance,
inquiries into a detained individual's sexual orientation or political
views are so flagrantly in violation of the scope prong that no matter
how minimal the prolongation of the detention, it would be patently
unreasonable to say that the officer was diligently pursuing the
justification for the stop. 20 In such a case, the subject of the
questioning is far enough divorced from any rationale justifying the
stop that it cannot be reasonably concluded the officer is using any
degree of diligence. 2 '
At the other extreme, traffic stop detentions could potentially be
long enough such that the duration alone renders the stop
unreasonable. For example, it is difficult to imagine a line of
questioning sufficiently narrow in scope enough to justify keeping a
120. It would be hard to imagine a court finding reasonableness if a police officer were
to proceed down a line of questioning prying into sexual orientation after pulling a
detainee over for speeding. See generally Amy L. Vazquez, Comment, "Do You Have Any
Drugs, Weapons, or Dead Bodies in Your Car?" What Questions Can a Police Officer Ask
During a Traffic Stop?, 76 TUL. L. REV. 211, 227 (2001) (noting that it would be
"ridiculous" to suggest that an officer might ask a detainee during a routine traffic stop if
he has any dead bodies in his car).
121. Such a case presents a unique issue given the holding in Johnson, where the Court
concluded that "inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic
stop.., do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure." 555
U.S. 323, 333 (2009). If, for instance, one police officer was conducting the intrusive line of
questioning (such as into sexual orientation) while another was writing the ticket,
presumably the stop would not be extended any longer than if the officer had not uttered
the question. This counterintuitive result suggests that applying a more flexible standard,
such as diligence, is the correct interpretation of the curious "measurably extend"
language employed by the Supreme Court.
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122
Of
suspect detained, without probable cause, for ninety minutes.
course, most of the common investigatory stops will not fall into one
of these extremes; rather, they will have to be analyzed on an
individualized basis to determine if the officer was acting diligently
based on the inverse relationship between scope and duration.

C.

Case Precedentand the Diligence Continuum

Under the diligence spectrum, considering minimal delays caused
by unrelated questioning de minimis, given the totality of the
123
circumstances, is wholly consistent with Fourth Circuit precedent.
In these cases, although the questioning is largely unrelated to the
justification of the stop, the minimal impact on duration justifies its
allowance under a diligence standard. Courts have noted that
innocuous questioning about the motorist's destination or purpose of
124
travel does not equate to a lack of diligence on the officer's behalf.
There is a key distinction to be drawn between these questions and
the extremely intrusive line of questioning discussed in the previous
Section. Whereas a line of questioning into sexual orientation is
wholly divorced from the scope prong, leaving no leeway with regard
to duration, questions about travel plans and travel history are
sufficiently related to scope to justify a brief prolongation. As courts
122. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709-10 (1983). This is not intended to
suggest that if a detainee's conduct causes the prolongation of the detention an officer will
be bound by a ninety-minute time limit to conclude the stop. See United States v. Sharpe,
470 U.S. 675, 688 (1985) ("We reject the contention that a 20-minute stop is unreasonable
when the police have acted diligently and a suspect's actions contribute to the added delay
about which he complains." (emphasis added)).
123. See United States v. Mason, 628 F.3d 123, 131 (4th Cir. 2010) ("It has never been
held that brief, incidental questioning about matters unrelated to the traffic violation
violates the Constitution."); United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 218-19 (4th Cir. 2008)
(determining that, during a traffic stop, the voluntary response by a stopped driver to a
few of the police officer's brief questions did not implicate the Fourth Amendment). The
First Circuit has also taken this view. United States v. Chhien, 266 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2001)
("Routine questioning [about the driver's itinerary], even when not directly related to the
violations that induced the stop in the first place, is not uncommon during a highway
stop.").
124. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005) ("[Wle accept the state court's
conclusion that the duration of the stop in this case was entirely justified by the traffic stop
and the ordinary inquiries incident to such a stop."); United States v. Peralez, 526 F.3d
1115, 1119 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that the usual tasks conducted by an officer during a
routine traffic stop involve "inquiring about the occupants' destination, route, and
purpose" (quoting United States v. Sanchez, 417 F.3d 971 (8th Cir. 2005)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Martin, 422 F.3d 597, 601-02 (7th Cir. 2005)
("A traffic stop does not become unreasonable merely because the officer asks questions
unrelated to the initial purpose for the stop, provided that those questions do not
unreasonably extend the amount of time that the subject is delayed." (citing United States
v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 953-54 (7th Cir. 2002))).

2012]

TRAFFIC STOP REASONABLENESS

2159

have noted, these questions help contextualize why the motorist was
behaving in a way that warranted the stop.125 As the Sixth Circuit has
held, "[s]uch context-framing questions will rarely suggest a lack of
'
diligence." 126
Of course, the bulk of a court's work when analyzing the
reasonableness of an investigatory traffic stop will be making the
distinctions between what conduct is de minimis in the totality of the
circumstances versus those situations warranting Fourth Amendment
protection. This is not a simple inquiry. It requires a court to view the
relationship of the questioning to the justification of the stop, the
quantity of the unrelated questioning, and the prolongation that
ensued due to the questioning. Courts have issued some guidance for
resolving this difficult question. For instance, if "questions unrelated
to the traffic violation constituted the bulk of the interaction between
the trooper and the [motorist]," an officer would not be diligently
pursuing the investigation. 7 When analyzing the scope of an officer's
questioning, some inquiries will be contextually related to the
justification of the stop, warranting the durational increase. 2 Others
'
will be "far[ther] afield,"129
"patroling [sic] the fourth amendment's
13
[sic] outer frontier."" Although difficult decisions are bound to
ensue at the margins, the framework's alignment with case precedent
provides courts adequate guidance in deciding an officer's diligence in
those cases falling within the spectrum's grey area.
D.

Benefits and Criticisms of the Diligence Standard

Analyzing reasonableness as the inverse relationship between
the scope of questioning and the duration of an investigatory stop
(embodied in the single diligence inquiry) affords numerous benefits
125. See, e.g., United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2001) ("[A]
motorist's travel history and travel plans may help explain, or put into context, why the
motorist was weaving (if tired) or speeding (if there was an urgency to the travel).").
126. United States v. Everett, 601 F.3d 484, 494 (6th Cir. 2010).
127. Peralez, 526 F.3d at 1121.
128. See, e.g., United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 337-38 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting that
the bulk of the inquiries arising from the traffic stop revolved around the issuance of the
traffic citation and verifying that the driver had permission to operate the vehicle after the
driver lied about the location of the owner of the vehicle).
129. United States v. Chhien, 266 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2001). For an example of police
questioning straying substantially from the justification for the stop, see People v.
Goeking, 780 N.E.2d 829, 830 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (where a police officer, after pulling a
woman over for turning without a signal, asked if she had any "knives, guns, drugs, dead
bodies, grenades, rocket launchers, [or] anything that shouldn't be in the vehicle").
130. LaFave, supra note 108, at 1846 (quoting United States v. Roberson, 6 F.3d 1088,
1092 (5th Cir. 1993)).
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over a strict no-prolongation standard or a policy unilaterally

scrutinizing duration. Most importantly, the diligence analysis stays
true to the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment, "a fact-bound,
context-dependent inquiry in each case." '3 ' Eliminating scope from
the reasonableness inquiry reduces the analysis to a time-specific
inquiry, which inherently fails to view the detention in light of "the
totality

of

the

'
circumstances."132

Moreover,

whereas

a

no-

prolongation rule incentivizes (or at least allows) officers to exploit
such a rule,133 evaluating the officer's actions in relation to the totality
of circumstances reduces an officer's ability to manipulate the rigid
language of the rule. Encapsulating the reasonableness inquiry into a
one dimensional durational analysis would strike a devastating blow
to the fact-specific nature of inquiries at the heart of the Fourth

Amendment.
From a fairness perspective, the flexible diligence framework
diminishes the counterintuitive results 31 4 stemming from the
13
simultaneous over- and under-inclusiveness of a bright-line rule. 1
Instead, it allows judges to compare and treat substantively analogous
cases similarly. 136 A durational inquiry alone would suppress

similarities in factually analogous cases, requiring judges to make
decisions based on the length of detentions and not the factual
context surrounding the scope of the questioning. Again, a rule
diminishing the traditional "totality of circumstances" inquiry into a
duration-centric analysis fundamentally (and adversely) affects the
fairness of the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment. When
reasonableness is the only concrete standard embodied in the
language of the Fourth Amendment, 137 adopting a rule that will
131. Everett, 601 F.3d at 493.
132. See United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 509 (4th Cir. 2011).
133. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term: Foreword: The Justices
of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 66 (1992). For a discussion of the ways a
no-prolongation rule could be exploited by officers, see supra notes 92-93 and
accompanying text.
134. See supra Part III.
135. Bright-line rules and strict standards strip a decision maker of his discretion. On
the other hand, standards "spare individuals from being sacrificed on the altar of rules."
Sullivan, supra note 133, at 66. For instance, a unilateral durational inquiry would be overinclusive in finding a constitutional violation when a rookie officer delays a stop because
he is uncertain how to issue a warning citation. See United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210,
219 (4th Cir. 2008). It would be under-inclusive when no constitutional violation is found
where a detainee is pulled over for speeding and while one officer is writing the citation,
another officer is pursuing a line of questioning into the detainee's sexual orientation, and
a third officer is circling the car with a narcotic-detecting dog.
136. See Sullivan, supranote 133, at 66.
137. See supra note 4.
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produce unreasonable results is a conceptual fallacy that should not
into Fourth Amendment
be systematically incorporated
jurisprudence.
Admittedly, the criticism of any flexible standard is the lack of
predictability the standard can offer. 138 However, the sheer number of
cases surrounding the investigatory stop paradigm would mitigate the
uncertainty of what conduct will be tolerated during an investigatory
stop. There will always be uncertainty in applying a flexible standard
to marginal cases; however, this framework clearly articulates a
standard, workable in any investigatory traffic stop situation, which
aligns with case precedent and clarifies the "measurably extend"
language set forth in Johnson.
CONCLUSION

In any given month, drivers in the United States account for
approximately 240 billion miles of highway travel.139 These same
highways simultaneously serve as "the battleground in the war on
drugs.""14 Given the combination of these two factors, it is no surprise
that courts are often called upon in the traffic stop context to operate
as independent arbitrators guarding the boundaries of the Fourth
Amendment in disputes arising among police officers and citizens.
Defining reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment proves a
complex, fact-intensive analysis requiring the balancing of numerous
competing interests. When the Supreme Court announces an
ambiguous standard, the reasonableness analysis is further
complicated. The Fourth Circuit's application of the diligence
standard in Digiovannioffers a workable framework for determining
when an investigatory traffic stop "measurably extends" a detention
in violation of the Fourth Amendment and remains true to the
individualized, contextual treatment fundamental to Fourth
Amendment reasonableness jurisprudence.
BRIAN J. LITWAK

138. See Sullivan, supra note 133, at 59.
139. See Traffic Volume Trends, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP.: FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN.,
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/travel-monitoring/tvt.cfm (last visited Aug. 17,
2012).
140. See LaFave, supra note 108, at 1844 n.8.

